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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Jeffrey Marsalis appeals from the summary dismissal of his petition for postconviction relief.

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
A grand jury indicted Marsalis for raping K.G. when she was “unable to resist” due
to being under the influence of either alcohol or a drug and/or when she was “unconscious
of the nature of the act because she was unconscious and/or asleep and/or not aware,
knowing, perceiving, or cognizant that the act occurred.” (#36806 R., pp. 39-40.) A jury
convicted following a trial, and his conviction was affirmed on appeal. State v. Marsalis,
151 Idaho 872, 264 P.3d 979 (Ct. App. 2011). Marsalis filed a petition for post-conviction
relief, initiating the instant case. (R., pp. 18-29.) The petition was amended twice. (R.,
pp.193-209, 280-98.) The second amended petition included, relevant to this appeal,
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to “challenge the [trial] testimony”
of a state’s expert regarding the blood alcohol content of the victim and Marsalis by either
1) objecting to its admissibility or 2) impeaching it with defense experts at trial (R., pp.
283-91); failing to call an allegedly favorable defense witness (R., pp. 291-93); and failing
to discuss speedy trial rights under the Interstate Agreement on Detainers with Marsalis
prior to Marsalis’s speedy trial waiver (R., pp. 293-96).
The state filed an answer and motion to dismiss, with an accompanying
memorandum and several exhibits. (R., pp. 327-91, 454-555.) Marsalis filed a response
to the state’s motion, with affidavits. (R., pp. 412-47, 556-73.) The district court granted
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the motion for summary dismissal. (R., pp. 576-88.) Marsalis timely appealed. (R., pp.
589-92, 596.)
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ISSUES
Marsalis states the issue on appeal as:
Whether the court erred in summarily dismissing the petition for postconviction relief based on ineffective assistance of counsel[.]
(Appellant’s brief, p. 6 (capitalization altered).)
The state rephrases the issues as:
1.
Has Marsalis failed to show error in the district court’s summary dismissal of his
claim that trial counsel was ineffective for not calling defense experts to rebut the
methodology of the state’s expert on the effects of intoxication?
2.
Has Marsalis failed to show error in the summary dismissal of his claim that trial
counsel was ineffective for failing to call a witness who stated he was not paying attention?
3.
Has Marsalis failed to show error in the dismissal of his claim that trial counsel was
ineffective for failing to explain his speedy trial rights under the Interstate Agreement on
Detainers?
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ARGUMENT
I.
Marsalis Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court’s Summary Dismissal Of His
Claim That Trial Counsel Was Ineffective For Not Calling Defense Experts To Rebut
The Methodology Of The State’s Expert On The Effects Of Intoxication
A.

Introduction
Marc LeBeau, a forensic scientist with a Ph.D. in forensic toxicology and unit chief

at the FBI laboratory in Quantico, Virginia, testified at trial on behalf of the prosecution.
(Trial Tr., p. 634, L. 18 – p. 636, L. 13.) Trial counsel stipulated that Dr. LeBeau was an
expert. (Trial Tr., p. 638, Ls. 1-9.) Dr. LeBeau testified about the general physiological
effects of central nervous system depressants, including alcohol, and various scenarios of
intoxication of both the victim, K.G., and Marsalis suggested by the evidence. (Trial Tr.,
p. 638, L. 10 – p. 676, L. 8.) Trial counsel cross-examined Dr. LeBeau about his testimony.
(Trial Tr., p. 677, L. 1 – p. 706, L. 6.)
In post-conviction Marsalis alleged trial counsel was ineffective for failing to
“challenge” the testimony of state’s witness Dr. LeBeau. (R., pp. 283-86.) The district
court found Dr. LeBeau’s testimony admissible under I.R.E. 702 and 403, and therefore it
was not ineffective assistance of counsel to fail to object on these bases. (R., pp. 580-82.)
The district court also found counsel’s performance was objectively reasonable. (R., pp.
582-83.)
On appeal Marsalis argues the district court erred, claiming that Dr. LeBeau’s
testimony was not admissible because the formulas used by Dr. LeBeau were not
scientifically reliable under the facts of this case. (Appellant’s brief, pp. 20-24.) He also
argues that the proposed defense witnesses would have helped the defense, and thus the
district court erred by dismissing the claim trial counsel was ineffective for not calling
4

defense experts. (R., pp. 24-27.) Applying the relevant law to the record shows that the
claims were properly summarily dismissed because Marsalis failed to present a prima facie
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.

B.

Standard Of Review
“On review of a dismissal of a post-conviction relief application without an

evidentiary hearing, this Court will determine whether a genuine issue of material fact
exists based on the pleadings, depositions and admissions together with any affidavits on
file.” Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518, 523, 164 P.3d 798, 803 (2007).

C.

Marsalis Has Shown No Error In The Summary Dismissal Of His Claim That Trial
Counsel Was Ineffective In Relation To The Testimony Of Dr. LeBeau
Post-conviction proceedings are governed by the Uniform Post-Conviction

Procedure Act. I.C. § 19-4901, et seq. A petition for post-conviction relief initiates a new
and independent civil proceeding in which the petitioner bears the burden of establishing
that he is entitled to relief. Workman, 144 Idaho at 522, 164 P.3d at 802; State v.
Bearshield, 104 Idaho 676, 678, 662 P.2d 548, 550 (1983).
Idaho Code § 19-4906 authorizes summary dismissal of an application for postconviction relief, in response to a party’s motion or on the court’s own initiative, if the
applicant “has not presented evidence making a prima facie case as to each essential
element of the claims upon which the applicant bears the burden of proof.” Berg v. State,
131 Idaho 517, 518, 960 P.2d 738, 739 (1998). Until controverted by the state, allegations
in a verified post-conviction application are, for purposes of determining whether to hold
an evidentiary hearing, deemed true. Cooper v. State, 96 Idaho 542, 545, 531 P.2d 1187,
1190 (1975). However, the court is not required to accept either the applicant’s mere
5

conclusory allegations, unsupported by admissible evidence, or the applicant’s conclusions
of law. Ferrier v. State, 135 Idaho 797, 799, 25 P.3d 110, 112 (2001); Roman v. State, 125
Idaho 644, 647, 873 P.2d 898, 901 (Ct. App. 1994). Further, allegations contained in a
post-conviction petition are insufficient for granting relief when they are clearly disproved
by the record of the original proceeding or do not justify relief as a matter of law.
Workman, 144 Idaho at 522, 164 P.3d at 802; Charboneau v. State, 144 Idaho 900, 903,
174 P.3d 870, 873 (2007).
A post-conviction petitioner alleging ineffective assistance of counsel must
demonstrate both deficient performance and resulting prejudice. Strickland v. Washington,
466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984); State v. Charboneau, 116 Idaho 129, 137, 774 P.2d 299, 307
(1989). Bare assertions and speculation, unsupported by specific facts, do not make out a
prima facie case for ineffective assistance of counsel. Roman, 125 Idaho at 649, 873 P.2d
at 903. An attorney’s performance is not constitutionally deficient unless it falls below an
objective standard of reasonableness, and there is a strong presumption that counsel’s
conduct is within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance. Gibson v. State,
110 Idaho 631, 634, 718 P.2d 283, 286 (1986); Davis v. State, 116 Idaho 401, 406, 775
P.2d 1243, 1248 (Ct. App. 1989). To establish prejudice, a defendant must show a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s deficient performance, the outcome of the
proceeding would have been different. Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758, 761, 760 P.2d
1174, 1177 (1988); Cowger v. State, 132 Idaho 681, 685, 978 P.2d 241, 245 (Ct. App.
1999).
Application of these principles to the record shows no material issue of fact related
to trial counsel’s actions in challenging the testimony of Dr. LeBeau. To the contrary,

6

Marsalis failed to present a prima facie claim that Dr. LeBeau’s testimony was
inadmissible, that counsel’s performance was deficient for not finding and calling defense
experts to testify about issues addressed by Dr. LeBeau’s testimony, or that Marsalis was
prejudiced by counsel’s tactical decisions. 1

1.

Counsel Was Not Ineffective For Failing To Object To Dr. LeBeau’s
Testimony Because The Testimony Was Admissible

A claim that counsel should have made a particular motion is properly rejected on
both prongs of the Strickland test if the motion would have been denied by the trial court.
Sanchez v. State, 127 Idaho 709, 713, 905 P.2d 642, 646 (Ct. App. 1995). Expert testimony
is admissible if it “assist[s] the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a
fact in issue.” State v. Joslin, 145 Idaho 75, 81, 175 P.3d 764, 770 (2007) (quotations
omitted); see also I.R.E. 702. “The function of the expert is to provide testimony on
subjects that are beyond the common sense, experience and education of the average juror.”
State v. Arrasmith, 132 Idaho 33, 42, 966 P.2d 33, 42 (Ct. App. 1998) (citations omitted).
A witness may be “qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or
education.” I.R.E. 702. “The determination of whether expert testimony will assist the
trier of fact lies within the broad discretion of the trial court.” State v. Parton, 154 Idaho
558, 563, 300 P.3d 1046, 1051 (2013) (quoting Kuhn v. Coldwell Banker Landmark, Inc.,

1

Despite finding that “the defendant would not have been in a materially different position
had defense counsel presented another expert,” the district court declined to “reach” the
prejudice prong because of its ruling on the deficient performance prong. (R., pp. 582833.) “Because this Court employs the same standards on appellate review that the trial
court applies in considering summary dismissal of a petition for post-conviction relief,” the
Court may affirm summary dismissal of a petition for post-conviction relief on any basis
presented to the lower court. Ridgley v. State, 148 Idaho 671, 676, 227 P.3d 925, 930
(2010). Thus, the state will argue on appeal that Marsalis’s claim of ineffective assistance
of counsel also fails on the prejudice prong.
7

150 Idaho 240, 252, 245 P.3d 992, 1004 (2010)). Marsalis has failed to show that the
district court abused its discretion in holding that Dr. LeBeau’s testimony was admissible
expert opinion, and has therefore failed to show he presented a prima facie claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel by not objecting to its admissibility.
The evidence at trial was that on the night in question Marsalis bought 10 Corona
beers, 10 Bud Light beers, and four shots of liquor (Kamikazes), which he shared with
K.G. (Trial Tr., p. 417, L. 13 – p. 427, L. 9.) Marsalis drank the Corona beers, K.G. drank
the Bud light beers, and they each drank Kamikazes. (Trial Tr., p. 427, L. 1 – p. 428, L.
13.) K.G. also ordered some drinks on her own, which she paid cash for. (Trial Tr., p.
428, Ls. 1-4.)
Dr. LeBeau testified that with certain information it is possible to formulate an
estimate of a person’s blood alcohol concentration by using a Widmark calculation, which
is a method accepted in the scientific community. (Trial Tr., p. 653, L. 10 – p. 655, L. 12.)
Based on the estimate of blood alcohol concentration, it is possible to determine what
effects the alcohol would have on an average person based on a scale developed in studies
by Kurt Dubowski. (Trial Tr., p. 655, L. 22 – p. 666, L. 13.) Using the factors shown by
the evidence (primarily K.G.’s height, weight, and sex, and her having drunk 11 Bud Lights
and two Kamikaze shots over four hours) Dr. LeBeau did a Widmark calculation estimating
K.G.’s blood alcohol concentration reached .28 percent (within a range based on
experience with drinking). (Trial Tr., p. 669, L. 21 – p. 670, L. 21.) Based on the Dubowski
scale the symptoms of such a blood alcohol concentration would have been “severe,” such
as inability to walk or stand on her own, vomiting, potential incontinence, and semiconsciousness or unconsciousness. (Trial Tr., p. 670, L. 22 – p. 671, L. 10.) Dr. LeBeau
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did a similar analysis of Marsalis, and concluded he would have been less affected by the
alcohol he drank. (Trial Tr., p. 671, L. 11 – p. 673, L. 11. 2) Dr. LeBeau also testified how
his analysis was consistent with witness observations of K.G.’s demeanor and behavior
that night, as well as K.G.’s recollection (or lack thereof) of events. (Trial Tr., p. 673, L.
12 – p. 676, L. 6.)
Given this foundation, the district court did not err in concluding that Dr. LeBeau’s
testimony would not have been excluded under I.R.E. 702. Indeed, Marsalis does not argue
that the foundation offered at trial was insufficient for admission of the testimony. Because
the evidence presented at trial was sufficient foundation for admission, and Marsalis does
not argue otherwise, the district court’s determination that there was no showing of
ineffective assistance of counsel for not objecting to the admission of Dr. LeBeau’s
testimony must be affirmed.

2.

Trial Counsel Was Not Ineffective For Failing To Secure Defense Experts

As noted, Marsalis does not argue on appeal that counsel was ineffective for failing
to object to Dr. LeBeau’s trial testimony based on the foundation laid at trial. Rather,
Marsalis argues that the opinions provided by potential defense experts in post-conviction
demonstrate that Dr. LeBeau’s testimony was too speculative to be admissible.
(Appellant’s brief, pp. 22-24.) Alternatively, he argues that the testimony of these experts

2

Using this same technique Dr. LeBeau estimated Marsalis’s BAC at about .16, which
would put him in the “excitement” category characterized by “loss of critical judgment,”
“[e]motional instability” (unexplained crying or anger), “[i]mpairment of perception” and
some memory, and “more severe” impairment of motor coordination. (Trial Tr., p. 663, L.
14 – p. 664, L. 9; p. 671, L. 12 – p. 672, L. 23.)
9

should have been presented at trial to undercut the testimony of Dr. LeBeau. (Appellant’s
brief, pp. 24-27.) Neither of these claims has merit.
The decision to call a witness falls within the category of trial counsel’s strategic
or tactical decisions and will generally not be second-guessed. Rodgers v. State, 129 Idaho
720, 724, 932 P.2d 348, 352 (1997). Thus, to prevail on a claim that trial counsel was
ineffective in failing to call a specific witness, a petitioner is required to present facts,
supported by admissible evidence, to “overcome the presumption that, under the
circumstances,

the

challenged

action

‘might

be

considered

sound

trial

strategy.’” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689 (1984) (citation omitted). “[I]n
order to succeed on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim based on counsel’s failure to
procure an expert witness, the accused must assert facts that would have been discovered
by additional investigation and should offer expert testimony that would have been
produced” if the expert had been hired. Aeschliman v. State, 132 Idaho 397, 405, 973 P.2d
749, 757 (Ct. App. 1999) (emphasis in original, citation and quotation omitted).
Additionally, the petitioner must show that the decision not to call a witness was the result
of an objective shortcoming such as inadequate preparation. Campbell v. State, 130 Idaho
546, 548, 944 P.2d 143, 145 (Ct. App. 1997).
These standards were applied to a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for not
calling a defense expert on the fallibility of eyewitness identification testimony in State v.
Payne, 146 Idaho 548, 563, 199 P.3d 123, 138 (2008). The Court pointed out that the
“decision of what witnesses to call is an area where we will not second guess counsel
without evidence of inadequate preparation, ignorance of the relevant law, or other
shortcomings capable of objective evaluation.”
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Id. (internal quotation and citation

omitted). Because Payne did not rebut the “presumption that counsel’s performance fell
within the acceptable range of professional assistance” with “evidence which suggests that
this decision resulted from inadequate preparation, ignorance or other shortcomings” his
allegation could not “lead to a successful post-conviction claim.” Id.
As pointed out by the district court, trial counsel chose to address potential
weaknesses in Dr. LeBeau’s methodology through cross-examination. (R., p. 582.) He
elicited testimony indicating that the victim’s vomiting could have been the result of
mixing beer and hard liquor rather than being drunk to the point of blacking out. (R., p.
582.) He further elicited testimony that “the Widmark formula and Dubowski chart are not
exact measurements.” (R., p. 582.) Moreover, “the defendant would not have been in a
materially different position had defense counsel presented another expert.” (R., p. 582.)
Given these circumstances, the district court found Marsalis had failed to present a
sufficient claim that trial counsel’s “performance was objectively unreasonable.” (R., p.
583.) Because the record does not show that counsel’s choice to address Dr. LeBeau’s
testimony through cross-examination was the result of inadequate preparation, ignorance
of the relevant law, or other shortcomings capable of objective evaluation, and because
there is no evidence of prejudice, the district court correctly concluded that Marsalis had
not presented a viable claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.
Marsalis’s appellate counsel accuses the district court of failing to “actually address
Petitioner’s allegations” and “ignor[ing] the evidence produced by Petitioner.”
(Appellant’s brief, p. 22.) It is counsel, however, who is ignoring the district court’s ruling.
The district court held there is no evidence of an objective shortcoming by trial counsel in
his choice to address Dr. LeBeau’s testimony through cross-examination rather than
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competing experts. (R., p. 583.) Marsalis points to no such evidence in the record, such
as evidence that counsel was unaware that he could have obtained experts, or that he
inadequately prepared for cross-examination, or any other evidence of an objective
shortcoming. He merely argues that because experts were available to the defense, trial
counsel was ineffective for not obtaining and presenting their testimony both in moving to
exclude Dr. LeBeau’s testimony and at trial. (Appellant’s brief, pp. 22-27.) As in Payne,
Marsalis cannot show a prima facie claim of deficient performance merely by pointing out
that favorable experts were available. 146 Idaho at 563, 199 P.3d at 138.

3.

Marsalis Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court’s Determination
That He Failed To Show Prejudice

This Court may also affirm on the basis that Marsalis had failed to show a viable
claim of prejudice. 3 First, had Marsalis called the proposed experts to support a motion in
limine the motion would have failed. 4 Second, because the proposed defense experts would

3
4

See footnote 1, supra.
The standard for admission of expert testimony is as follows:
The admissibility of expert testimony is governed by I.R.E. 702, which provides
that an expert witness may testify and offer opinions regarding specialized
knowledge that will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to
determine a fact in issue. To be admissible, the information, theory or methodology
upon which the expert’s opinion is based need not be commonly agreed upon by
experts in the field, but it must have sufficient indicia of reliability to meet I.R.E.
702 requirements. Expert testimony which is speculative, conclusory, or
unsubstantiated by facts in the record is of no assistance to the trier of fact and as
such, is inadmissible. However, the fact that a party disagrees with an opposing
party’s expert, or the means by which the expert reached his or her conclusion,
does not necessarily mean that the expert’s opinion is inadmissible. Because expert
testimony is introduced to assist the trier of fact, the task of weighing an expert’s
testimony is dedicated to the trier of fact.

Pocatello Hosp., LLC v. Quail Ridge Med. Inv’r, LLC, 156 Idaho 709, 715, 330 P.3d 1067,
1073 (2014) (internal quotations, citations and brackets omitted, emphasis added).
12

only have impeached Dr. LeBeau’s methodology, but not his conclusions, and because his
conclusions are otherwise supported by the evidence, Marsalis did not show a likelihood
that presenting the proposed experts would have affected the outcome of the trial.
Dr. Anstine, a professor of chemistry, would have testified for the defense that the
Widmark formula is “generally accepted in BAC estimations” and “gives very precise
calculations” but “does not automatically lead to accurate values” because individuals are
“unique” and there are “a multitude of physiological and biochemical variables” that could
affect BAC. (R., p. 433.) Variables that could affect the result include body mass index,
dehydration, altitude, body temperature, time of day, and regularity of alcohol
consumption. (R., p. 435.) He stated that “extreme caution must be used when the
subjective results of a hypothetical if not arbitrary range of values from a Widmark
calculation are generated.” (R., p. 435.) Related to the Widmark calculation, “good
scientific practice” is to “look at multiple overlapping” techniques such as breath or blood
testing. (R., p. 437.)
As to the Dubowski chart, Dr. Anstine would have testified that “[g]reat caution
must be used in assessing a [sic] individuals [sic] ‘stage of alcoholic influence,’ as each
individual is very [sic] unique and how different individuals are affected by alcohol has
enormous ranges of influence.” (R., p. 436.) He recommended using the chart in
conjunction with “eye-witness accounts along with any available video or audio files of the
individual.” (R., p. 437.)
Dr. Anstine concluded that in the absence of BAC test results or video or audio
evidence of the state of intoxication Dr. LeBeau’s conclusions were “complete
speculation” and that “[s]cientifically, there is no way to know either of their levels of
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intoxication with any accuracy or certainty.” (R., p. 438.) Dr. Anstine did not explain
how, after stating that eyewitness accounts of a person’s state of intoxication were
appropriate to use in conjunction with the Dubowski chart, Dr. LeBeau’s use of eyewitness
accounts of K.G.’s intoxication was improper.
Dr. Fromme, a professor of clinical psychology, would have testified that K.G.’s
description of events was “consistent with the experience of alcohol-induced blackouts.”
(R., pp. 439-41.)

Such blackouts “involve primarily anterograde amnesia, meaning

memory loss for events occurring after alcohol intake.” (R., p. 442.) K.G. suffered from
both “[f]ragmentary blackouts” and an “en bloc blackout.” (R., pp. 442-43.) “While in a
blackout, a person is able to engage in a range of complex activities, such as carrying on a
conversation, driving, or having sexual intercourse, but they are simply not forming
memories for those events” and “their actions may be seen as conscious and volitional to
an observer.” (R., p. 442.) She further stated that “there is no basis for the specific signs
and symptoms associated with the BAC levels in the Dubowski chart” and “the BAC levels
in each category are so large that they are not useful for any given person.” (R., p. 444.)
She concluded that “a complete scientific evaluation of the role of alcohol intoxication and
alcohol-induced blackouts was not presented at the trial.” (R., p. 444.)
The primary points made by the proposed defense experts were: the accuracy of the
Widmark calculation is limited because of the many possible variables involved; the
usefulness of the Dubowski chart is either limited or non-existent because of the many
different ways alcohol may affect an individual; and because alcoholic blackout is
anterograde amnesia, it does not necessarily indicate incapacity. Dr. LeBeau testified to
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these limitations on the Widmark calculation and the Dubowski chart and about
anterograde amnesia.
First, Dr. LeBeau testified that the Widmark calculation of BAC is an estimate,
based on many variables. (Trial Tr., p. 653, L. 10 – p. 655, L. 12; p. 661, L. 11 – p. 662,
L. 1; p. 666, L. 7 – p. 667, L. 7; p. 669, L. 21 – p. 670, L. 21; p. 677, L. 13 – p. 681, L. 25;
p. 683, L. 17 – p. 686, L. 3; p. 688, L. 24 – p. 691, L. 2; p. 693, L. 2 – p. 697, L. 5; p. 706,
Ls. 17-25.) Dr. LeBeau specifically testified the Widmark calculation was “an estimate,”
“not an absolute,” and “[t]here’s some error associated with it” (Trial Tr., p. 654, Ls. 2022); that the many factors that affect BAC include physiological, the type of drink, the size
of the drinks, dehydration and even altitude (Trial Tr., p. 661, L. 11 – p. 662, L. 1; see also
p. 684, L. 3 – p. 685, L. 14); and that more accurate information would lead to a more
accurate calculation (Trial Tr., p. 678, L. 25 – p. 679, L. 5; p. 685, L. 15 – p. 686, L. 3). In
making the estimate for K.G. on the night in question the factors included height, weight,
food consumption, and the type and amounts of drinks she had. (Trial Tr., p. 669, L. 21 –
p. 671, L. 4.) The only significant difference between the state’s expert and the proposed
defense experts on the Widmark calculation is that the defense expert concluded that Dr.
LeBeau “relied too heavily” on the Widmark formula because there was “no way to know”
K.G.’s level of intoxication “with any accuracy or certainty.” (R., p. 438.) Dr. Anstine did
not otherwise dispute application of the Widmark formula, such as by claiming that K.G.
would have had a lower BAC on the night in question. That Dr. Anstine believes the state
relied too much on it does not show use of the Widmark formula inadmissible, nor does it
meaningfully diminish the strength of the state’s case.
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Second, Dr. LeBeau testified about the Dubowski chart of symptoms associated
with different BAC levels, which arose from controlled experiments correlating symptoms
of intoxication to BAC levels. (Trial Tr., p. 655, L. 22 – p. 659, L. 24; p. 662, L. 14 – p.
666, L. 6; p. 670, L. 22 – p. 671, L. 10.) He testified that observations of witnesses who
saw K.G. that night were consistent with those symptoms. (Trial Tr., p. 673, L. 18 – p.
676, L. 1. See also Trial Tr., p. 706, Ls. 17-25 (calculation was for a “general purpose” of
determining what “the highest alcohol concentration that, potentially, could have been
reached” and to help determine whether that BAC corresponds to the “symptoms” K.G.
suffered that night). Dr. Anstine generally would have testified about the limitations of the
Dubowski chart. (R., pp. 435-36.) His testimony is not inconsistent with Dr. LeBeau’s.
Dr. Fromme, the clinical psychology professor, would have testified not only to the
limitations of the chart based on individual variability, but would have testified she was
not “able to find any scientific basis for the signs and symptoms attributed to the categories
of BAC in the Dubowski chart.” (R., p. 444.) She does not explain why controlled
experiments in correlating symptoms to BAC would lack a scientific basis. Again, the
defense experts do not reach different conclusions about K.G.’s intoxication or capacity,
but only attack whether her BAC and the symptoms of her intoxication may be accurately
quantified. These differences do not make Dr., LeBeau’s testimony inadmissible, nor do
they meaningfully diminish the strength of the state’s case.
The only proposed testimony that does not just attempt to impeach Dr. LeBeau, but
arguably is relevant to the facts of the case, is Dr. Fromme’s testimony about alcoholinduced blackouts. Specifically, she would have testified that K.G.’s statements were
“consistent with the experience of alcohol-induced blackouts,” which are “primarily
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anterograde amnesia, meaning memory loss for events occurring after alcohol intake,” and
that having that loss of memory does not mean that “other cognitive abilities are necessarily
impaired.” (R., pp. 441-43.) Thus, the actions of a person in a blackout “may be seen as
conscious and volitional to an observer.” (R., p. 442.) This evidence, however, was
entirely consistent with Dr. LeBeau’s testimony. (Trial Tr., p. 642, L. 3 – p. 643, L. 22.)
More importantly, the state presented evidence of eyewitnesses that K.G. was in fact
semiconscious or unconscious immediately prior to the rape. (Trial Tr., p. 458, L. 21 – p.
479, L. 21.) Dr. Fromme’s testimony that blackouts do not “necessarily” mean that a
person has a loss of consciousness would ultimately not have assisted the defense.

4.

Conclusion

Marsalis presented the affidavits of two experts willing to testify that, because of
the wide number of variables, the state’s expert’s opinion based on formulating a BAC
from evidence of the circumstances of the night, and then extrapolating symptoms related
to that level of intoxication, was not reliable. The mere fact that such testimony was
available did not show an objective shortcoming such as ignorance or lack of preparation
by trial counsel. Moreover, the evidence merely impeached the state’s expert by presenting
different opinions on the scientific reliability of the expert’s methodology, but did not
actually undercut any of the evidence showing that K.G. was too intoxicated to consent to
sexual intercourse.

Marsalis failed to show a prima facie claim of either deficient

performance or prejudice.
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II.
Marsalis Has Shown No Error In The Summary Dismissal Of His Claim Trial Counsel
Was Ineffective For Failing To Call A Witness Who Stated He Was Not Paying Attention
A.

Introduction
Marsalis presented a transcript of an interview with John Hampton. (R., pp. 305-

10.) Hampton stated that he did not observe Marsalis force K.G. into or out of the cab.
(R., pp. 306-10.) He did not see Marsalis supporting K.G., but acknowledged he was not
paying attention to that. (R., p. 308.) Marsalis alleged it was ineffective assistance of trial
counsel to not call Hampton. (R., pp. 291-93.)
The district court found no deficient performance in the decision to not call a
“witness who wasn’t paying attention and had been drinking that night” and therefore
Marsalis had presented “no issue of material fact” on the claim. (R., pp. 583-84.) On
appeal Marsalis falsely claims the district court was making a “credibility determination,”
asserts that the court had to specifically reference the affidavit of his expert attorney, and
rightly points out that the court could just as easily have found no prejudice. (Appellant’s
brief, pp. 30-31.) This “argument” is not cogent and must be rejected. Even though
Marsalis makes no attempt to apply or to ask this Court to apply the correct legal standards,
such application shows no error.

B.

Standard Of Review
“On review of a dismissal of a post-conviction relief application without an

evidentiary hearing, this Court will determine whether a genuine issue of material fact
exists based on the pleadings, depositions and admissions together with any affidavits on
file.” Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518, 523, 164 P.3d 798, 803 (2007).
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C.

It Was Not Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel To Decline To Call A Witness Who
Admitted He Was Not Paying Attention
A claim of error is waived on appeal “if not supported by any cogent argument or

authority in [the] opening brief.” State v. Baxter, 163 Idaho 231, 235 n.4, 409 P.3d 811,
815 n.4 (2018) (quotations omitted). See also State v. Wharton, 162 Idaho 666, 671, 402
P.3d 1119, 1124 (Ct. App. 2017) (“A party waives an issue on appeal if either authority or
argument is lacking.”).

Marsalis’s “argument” has no known connection with the

applicable law and is therefore not cogent. He has not shown from the record that the
district court made any sort of credibility analysis that should have been reserved for an
evidentiary hearing. He has cited no authority for the proposition that a court may not
consider the potential credibility of a witness in evaluating the effectiveness of defense
counsel in choosing to not call that witness. In short, Marsalis’s claim of error is not
supported by cogent argument.
If Marsalis’s complete failure to present argument based on relevant law is
overlooked, application of the correct legal standards shows no error. The decision to call
a witness falls within the category of trial counsel’s strategic or tactical decisions and will
generally not be second-guessed. Rodgers v. State, 129 Idaho 720, 724, 932 P.2d 348, 352
(1997). To overcome the presumption that tactical decisions are reasonable, the petitioner
must show that the decision not to call a witness was the result of an objective shortcoming
such as inadequate preparation. Campbell v. State, 130 Idaho 546, 548, 944 P.2d 143, 145
(Ct. App. 1997). Here there is no evidence of inadequate preparation or any other objective
shortcoming. As noted by the district court, it was reasonable to not call a witness who
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would testify that, even though he did not see that K.G. needed help to stand, he had been
drinking and was not paying attention. 5 Marsalis has failed to show error.

III.
Marsalis Has Shown No Material Issue Of Fact Related To His Claim Counsel Was
Ineffective For Failing To Discuss The Speedy Trial Requirement Of The Interstate
Agreement On Detainers
A.

Introduction
Marsalis claimed that his counsel was ineffective for not discussing with him the

120-day speedy trial limitation applicable under the Interstate Agreement on Detainers
(“IAD”) prior to his waiver of speedy trial. (R., pp. 293-96.) The prosecutor argued that
stipulations to continue the trial to address new DNA evidence and for a change of venue
were the reason for the speedy trial waiver, and that the record in the underlying criminal
case showed Marsalis concurred with delaying the trial for those reasons. (R., pp. 465-67,
522-55.)

The district court concluded that trial counsel reasonably requested a

continuance, and that the requested continuance was good cause to not try Marsalis within
the speedy trial time even without the waiver. (R., pp. 584-87.)
On appeal Marsalis argues that he had no notice of the district court’s basis for
dismissing this claim. (Appellant’s brief, pp. 38-40.) He also argues the district court erred
on the merits. (R., pp. 41-42.) He also argues he was prejudiced. (R., pp. 42-45.) None
of Marsalis’s arguments withstands analysis.

5

Appellate counsel argues Mr. Hampton might not have been paying attention because
“there was nothing to pay attention to.” (Appellant’s brief, p. 30.) Counsel’s evidencefree speculation falls far short of showing a material issue of fact.
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B.

Standard Of Review
“On appeal from an order of summary dismissal, we apply the same standards

utilized by the trial courts and examine whether the petitioner’s admissible evidence asserts
facts which, if true, would entitle the petitioner to relief. Over questions of law, we exercise
free review.” Roberts v. State, 163 Idaho 660, 662, 417 P.3d 986, 988 (Ct. App. 2018)
(citations omitted).

C.

Marsalis Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court’s Summary Dismissal Of
His Claim Counsel Was Ineffective For Failing To Discuss The Interstate
Agreement On Detainer’s Speedy Trial Statute With Him
“To survive summary dismissal of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, [the

petitioner] must show a material issue of fact exists with respect to both deficient
performance and prejudice.” State v. Hall, 163 Idaho 744, 815, 419 P.3d 1042, 1113
(2018). Here Marsalis showed no material issue of fact as to either.
The relevant speedy trial provision of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers
(“IAD”) provides that “trial shall be commenced within one hundred twenty (120) days of
the arrival of the prisoner in the receiving state, but for good cause shown in open court,
the prisoner or his counsel being present, the court having jurisdiction of the matter may
grant any necessary or reasonable continuance.” I.C. § 19-5001(d)(3). The record of the
underlying criminal case shows that prior to the 120-day limitation period running, the
parties stipulated to a change of venue and to continue the trial. (R., pp. 524-49.) In
conjunction with this continuance Marsalis executed a speedy trial waiver of both his
constitutional and statutory speedy trial rights. (R., p. 550.)
In rejecting Marsalis’s claim that counsel was ineffective for allegedly failing to
fully explain the IAD speedy trial rights, the district court reasoned that because
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“[s]cheduling is not a fundamental right,” and therefore scheduling decisions are left to the
discretion of defense counsel and need not be knowingly waived, there was “no error” by
counsel in requesting a continuance. (R., pp. 584-85.) “Moreover, even though ‘good
cause’ did not need to be shown because of the agreement, there was good cause shown on
the record. Therefore, defense counsel effectively, but properly, waived the plaintiff’s right
to trial within 120 days.” (R., p. 585.) In addition, the court found no prejudice because
the 120-day speedy trial right granted by the IAD was not intended to preserve the fairness
of trial, the venue change and continuance were designed to enhance the fairness of the
trial, and therefore there was no evidence that the outcome of the trial would have been
different but for counsel’s alleged deficiency. (R., pp. 585-87.)
The district court was correct on both prongs of the ineffective assistance of counsel
standard. Marsalis has cited no law indicating that, even had he wanted to exercise his
right to a trial within 120 days, the IAD gave him the right to override his counsel’s tactical
decision to seek a change of venue and a continuance to prepare to meet DNA evidence at
trial. Moreover, his waiver was not required where, as the district court found here, there
was good cause to continue the trial for a change of venue and to address new DNA
evidence. Even accepting his allegation that counsel failed to inform him of speedy trial
rights specifically granted by the IAD, such was insufficient to show either deficient
performance or prejudice.
Marsalis first argues that the district court granted summary dismissal on a theory
different than presented in the summary dismissal motion, and therefore he lacked notice.
(Appellant’s brief, pp. 38-40.) If a trial court dismisses a claim based upon grounds other
than those offered by the State’s motion for summary dismissal and accompanying
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memoranda, “the defendant seeking post-conviction relief must be provided with a 20–day
notice period.” Kelly v. State, 149 Idaho 517, 523, 236 P.3d 1277, 1283 (2010). However,
“[w]hen a trial court summarily dismisses an application for post-conviction relief based
in part on the arguments presented by the State, this is sufficient to meet the notice
requirements.” Id. (emphasis original). “In determining whether the State provided
adequate notice as to grounds upon which summary dismissal is sought or whether a
genuine issue of material fact exists, the Court will not confine its review to discrete
portions of relevant documents but will review all of the pleadings, depositions and
admissions together with any affidavit on file.” Takhsilov v. State, 161 Idaho 669, 673,
389 P.3d 955, 959 (2016) (internal quotations omitted). Review shows that the district
court’s dismissal was based on the state’s arguments.
In support of its motion for summary dismissal the state argued that the record of
the underlying criminal proceedings established “multiple reasons for the continuance
which, in fact, were in the interests of the Petitioner.” (R., p. 466.) Specifically, counsel
stipulated to a continuance based on new DNA evidence and for a change of venue based
on local media coverage before securing Marsalis’s waiver of speedy trial rights. (R., pp.
465-66.) “Even if Petitioner was erroneously given information that speedy trial was 180
days versus 120 days from the time he was brought back to Idaho, Petitioner waived these
rights to take advantage of receiving additional discovery materials including a DNA
semen blood match and the favorable change of venue.” (R., p. 467.) Thus there was no
ineffective assistance of counsel. (R., p. 467.) Moreover, the defense “would have been
at a disadvantage” by proceeding to trial within 120 days and without a change in venue.
(R., p. 467.)
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The state’s argument was specifically based on the fact that trial counsel, prior to
securing the speedy trial waiver, sought and obtained a stipulation for a change of venue
and for a continuance. Although the state never specifically argued that counsel’s decision
to get a continuance and a change of venue rendered whether the waiver was knowing a
nullity, such is implicit in both the state’s argument and the district court’s analysis.
Because neither the state nor the district court took the position that securing a
waiver of IAD speedy trial rights without adequate explanation of those rights was not
deficient performance, both addressed their analysis to the prejudice prong. The state
argued that because the underlying reason for the waiver was to secure the tactical
advantages of a change of venue and a continuance for trial preparation, the waiver would
have been entered even if counsel had provided a more detailed or accurate explanation of
the IAD speedy trial rights. This district court’s analysis on this first argument is slightly,
but not materially, different: rather than showing Marsalis would have waived anyway,
counsel’s decision to pursue a venue change and continuance showed that the waiver was
unnecessary. The state also argued that trying the case within 120 days would have put the
defense at a greater disadvantage. The court’s analysis of this second argument, that a trial
within 120 days without a change of venue was unlikely to produce a different result than
the trial that in fact happened, is the same.
Marsalis was put on notice that counsel’s actions in seeking a continuance and a
change of venue disproved his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. The slight
variance between the state’s analysis of that issue and the court’s analysis of that issue did
not deprive Marsalis of adequate notice. Furthermore, Marsalis was given adequate notice
on the second ground for finding no prejudice—that a trial held within 120 days was not
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more likely to produce a different outcome than the trial in fact held. Marsalis’s argument
that he lacked notice of the grounds for dismissal is without merit.
Moreover, the dismissal was proper under the state’s theory even if differentiated
from the court’s analysis. The record shows that Marsalis waived all his constitutional and
statutory speedy trial rights in order to secure a continuance and change of venue. The
only legal difference between the constitutional, statutory, and IAD speedy trial rights is
the time (120 days vs. 180 days, vs. an indefinite time of at least a year). Marsalis presented
no evidence that had counsel in fact specifically addressed the IAD speedy trial rights with
him he would have insisted on a trial within 120 days. Likewise, he presented no evidence
of a reasonable probability that the outcome of a trial held within 120 days and without a
change of venue would have been different than the results of the trial that in fact occurred.
The state argued, and the district court ultimately concluded, that counsel’s alleged
failure to specifically discuss the IAD speedy trial rights prejudiced Marsalis. Counsel
elected to seek a continuance to respond to new DNA evidence and to change venue. That
decision would have resulted in a continuance past the 120-day limitation period either
because the waiver would still have been entered or because it would not ultimately have
mattered. In addition, a trial within 120 days was not more likely to produce a different
result than the one in fact held. Marsalis failed to allege a viable claim of prejudice from
his allegation of deficient performance.
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CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the district court’s summary
dismissal of Marsalis’s petition for post-conviction relief.
DATED this 3rd day of December, 2018.
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